Free Cash Flow (FCF) was adopted in the late 1980s as a financial tool to evaluate the firm and its individual projects. We question the procedure of calculating the FCF where a significant portion of Current Liabilities is offset against Current Assets, thereby creating the hybrid asset Net...

This paper examines how the quality of firm information disclosure affects shareholders' use of dividends to mitigate agency problems. Managerial compensation is linked to firm value. However, because the manager and shareholders are asymmetrically informed, the manager can manipulate the firm's...

This paper examines the liquidity, Tobin's Q, and cost of equity effects from voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognising that the level of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) in a country will...

Corporate-level fraudulent activity has instilled a state of concern and heightened awareness in investors, the media and employees alike as perceived sensitivity to illegal behavior continues to increase. With corporate giants such as Enron, Tyco and Health South being prime examples of this...

Using hand-collected data on Israeli firms' unrealized earnings and debt restructurings following adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), we investigate whether and how dividend payouts based on unrealized revaluation earnings affect a firm's default risk. Our results...

This paper examines changes in corporate behavior around the 2003 modification to SEC Rule 10b-18, which mandates enhanced disclosure of repurchase transactions. Firms announce significantly fewer and slightly smaller open market repurchase plans in the enhanced disclosure environment. However,...

A U.S. firm buying and selling its own shares in the open market can trade on inside information more easily than its own insiders because it is subject to less stringent trade- disclosure rules. Not surprisingly, insiders exploit these relatively lax rules to engage in indirect insider trading:...

When shareholders of a target firm expect a value improving takeover to be successful, they are individually better off not tendering their shares to the buyer and the takeover potentially fails. Squeeze-out procedures can overcome this free-riding dilemma by allowing a buyer to enforce a payout...

Agency theory - as applied to debates in corporate governance - rests on a myth of separated ownership and control. The true separation, however, is between ownership and ownership: ownership of shares by shareholders and ownership of assets by the corporation. Shareholders are not principals;...

This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm's stock - even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances...