This study investigates whether international differences in legal enforcement are associated with venture capital (VC) syndication networks, and whether culture moderates this relationship. We conjecture that public enforcement, with strong investigative powers against any syndicate member and...

I study how the corporate corruption culture of foreign suppliers and customers influences the propensity and magnitude of financial misconducts of US corporations. Using the World Bank Corruption Control Index, I find that firms connected to customers( suppliers) from countries with higher...

Scholars and antitrust enforcers have raised concerns about anticompetitive effects that may arise when institutional investors hold substantial stakes in competing firms. Their concern rests on empirical evidence that such common concentrated ownership is associated with higher prices and lower...

We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's...

We show that firms that employ the majority voting method for director election exhibit higher institutional ownership than firms that employ the plurality voting method, especially after the 2010 amendment to NYSE Rule 452. Firms that adopt majority voting in a bylaw or charter exhibit...

As blockholders in most public firms, the "Big Three"" passive fund managers — Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street — have an outsized influence on shareholder voting. While these investors tend to vote according to management's recommendations, it is unclear whether they are overly...

The secured borrowing based on sell/buy-backs agreements is studied, specifically considering both: quantity and price. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that, after controlling for specific individual characteristics, group-specific effects (defined by belonging or not to...

This paper develops a dynamic trading framework that determines jointly agents' counterparties and transaction prices as part of the equilibrium, instead of assuming that agents match and bargain exogenously. We show that because of limited information in the decentralized market, the roles of...

We study entrepreneurs' start-up financing from banks and local financiers. An informal network, whose membership cannot be observed by outsiders, conveys the good signals it gets about the hidden types of network entrepreneurs to local financiers, which are then reflected in different loan...

This paper develops a model to study the formation and regulation of information transmission networks. We analyze a cat and mouse game between a regulator, who sets and enforces a regulatory environment, and agents, who form networks to disseminate and share insider information. For any given...