theoretical and practical contributions to the design of matching markets by Al Roth. As prices do not play their usual role in …-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

theoretical and practical contributions to the design of matching markets by Al Roth. As prices do not play their usual role in …-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …

matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the … model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate … defendants' and attorneys' preferences will make defendants worse off. More precisely, if we switch from random matching to …

-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in … two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the existence of a bijection between the CCs structures and the lattice …

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride … algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively …

We model platform markets with the matching-with-contracts framework. The solution concept in matching with contracts …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

We study a one-to-one two-sided matching market in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value … which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. We prove that envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this … of the square root of the number of men in each type. Therefore, in large matching markets, envy becomes zero; on top of …