Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 11,776
Cover Image
Why do firms use equity-based pay? Managerial compensation and stock price informativeness
Bennett, Benjamim; Garvey, Gerald; Milbourn, Todd; … - 2019
compensation of managers switching between firms with different SPI …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107682
Cover Image
Noise Hedging and Executive Compensation
Doherty, Neil A. - 2013
We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092522
Cover Image
The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts
Lund, Andrew - 2014
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
Cover Image
Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts
Stark, Johanna - 2020
Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330
Cover Image
Managerial Compensation When Managers are Principals
Wan, Kam-Ming - 2011
corporations, managers own enough of their firms' voting rights to be able to decide with relative impunity how they will be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126272
Cover Image
Stock-based compensation plans and employee incentives
Zábojník, Ján - 2014
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
Cover Image
Performance-Contingent Executive Compensation and Managerial Behavior
Bizjak, John M. - 2015
Recent regulation and legislation, along with the growing influence of compensation consultants and proxy advisors, have led to an increase in performance-contingent awards. A majority of these awards contain performance conditions tied explicitly to accounting measures. Both the structure of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031959
Cover Image
Performance-based compensation and firm value : experimental evidence
Pfeiffer, Glenn M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Accounting horizons : a quarterly publication of the … 29 (2015) 4, pp. 777-798
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428910
Cover Image
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949