In this paper, I analyze the incentives of a monopolistic platform to open its infrastructure to an entrant on the buyer side of the market. If buyer and seller demands are linear and identical, and if the entrant operates on a separate market, I show that entry distorts the price structure in...

Big companies and small innovation factories possess different advantages in a patent contest. While large firms typically have a better access to product markets, small firms often have a superior R&D efficiency. In this paper I model a patent contest with asymmetric firms. In a pre-contest...

We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist's choice of R&D portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz's finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the...

The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would...

This paper presents a duopoly model of e-business technology adoption. A leader and a follower benefit from a new e-business technology with uncertain quality depending on its innovation and adoption cost and both firms' adoption timing. When innovation and adoption require large set-up costs,...

We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that...