Globally, real estate trade is highly regularized. Usually, the market value is not negotiated simply between the seller and potential buyer but based on an assessment performed by a professional valuer, known as a surveyor or appraiser. This paper inquires about the economic role of valuers in...

This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with exogenous vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between quality difference, relocation cost, and marginal damage of emissions in a two-country-setting for three cases: An...

This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with exogenous vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between quality difference, relocation cost, and marginal damage of emissions in a two-country-setting for three cases: An...

This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with exogenous vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between quality difference, relocation cost, and marginal damage of emissions in a two-country-setting for three cases: An...

This paper estimates an individual level demand model for eggs differentiated by animal welfare. Typically, after minimum quality standards for eggs are raised, the price of higher quality eggs falls. As a result, consumer welfare is redistributed from households who do not value animal welfare...

Using a discrete-continuous model that deals with both consumers' choice and usage of an environmentally differentiated product in a utility-consistent framework, this paper investigates welfare impacts of emission taxes, subsidies and ad valorem taxes/subsidies on a green market where consumers...

We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer...

We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We show that there is always a "no-merger" equilibrium where firms do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may also be a "cut-off" equilibrium if the...

In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...