The article examines the determinants of capital-asset ratios for credit unions in the United States, before and after the implementation of current framework for capital adequacy regulation in the year 2000. Credit unions appear to hold capital in excess of what is required by current capital...

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks....

The low level participation of the Islamic banks in mudharabah and musharakah financing models has become one of the problems in the development of the industry. This arrangements are unique to Islamic banking and account for its superiority over conventional banking on grounds of ethics and...

We investigate the effects of increased bond market transparency on the risk sensitivity of yield spreads for bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures after bond markets became more transparent in 2002. Models of yield spread levels and yield spread changes show improvement in normal...

This study develops a multi-period structural model to value bank subordinated debt (subdebt) under different regulatory policies. The model provides a complete framework for analyzing how various factors, such as credit and interest rate risks, bank characteristics and regulatory policies...

Using supervisory data for US banks, we evaluate the alignment of Basel II/III AIRB (Advanced Internal Ratings Based) risk estimates with portfolio risk. We use loan performance as a direct measure of portfolio risk as well as less direct market-based measures. Our results document that loan...

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...

We investigate the link between firm size and risk-taking among financial institutions during the period of 1998-2008 and make three contributions. First, size is positively correlated with risk-taking measures even when controlling for other observable firm characteristics. This is consistent...

This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega). The results are more profound when bank lenders are...