We analyze the optimal licensing contract that a patentee provides for a cost reducing innovation to a set of firms competing in a downstream market. We study two alternative licensing regimes: (i) a combination of royalties on sales and flat fees and (ii) fixed fees only. The first contract...

In this paper, we study the welfare consequences of imposing alternative regimes of competition between two non-benevolent local governments that compete for mobile firms which have private information on their degree of locational attachment or home bias.In an environment in which politicians...

Examines the optimal licensing agreement between thepatent holder of a cost-cutting technology and firms that have various uses forthe innovation. This is accomplished through the development of a model ofpatent licensing that integrates two important features largely unexplored inthe...

We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location. In a game between local authorities, we find that, when...