This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an...

This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to...

There are two very different sources of market power in antitrust cases. The first is traditional market sharebased market power. Market power in antitrust cases also can come from deception, significantly imperfect or asymmetric information, or other types of market failures that usually are...

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every...

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish...

The conventional wisdom is that current antitrust damage levels are too high, lead to overdeterrence, and should be cut back. Although most agree that threefold damages are fine for cartels, the combination of treble damages to direct purchasers and another treble damages to indirect purchasers...