We examine the role of private deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a financial …

Prior to the Great Depression, regulators imposed double liability on bank shareholders to ensure financial stability … mitigating bank risks and providing a safety net for depositors before and during the Great Depression. We first develop a model … that demonstrates two competing effects of double liability: a direct effect that constrains bank risk taking as a result …

needs withdraw their deposits early and are not willing to re finance a bank. Early withdrawals curtail excessive bank … lending and thereby commit a bank to monitoring. In contrast, banks with coupon bonds can refi nance in the interim stage and … expand on risky lending, which derails monitoring. This finding speaks against the separation of bank lending and deposit …

. In this paper, we use a regime-switching open-economy DSGE model with bank default to assess the relative efficiency of … can complement each other and that EDIS can prevent bank runs under certain conditions. …

private bank deposits are a quasi-merit good. Bank stakeholders, as the true beneficiaries of uninterrupted supply of … household savings, seek to exploit the public desire for bank stability. They join with other social and political groups to …

We study how deposit competition affects a bank’s decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state …

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is … value, and a risk measure, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at …

Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on …

This study develops a multi-period structural model to value bank subordinated debt (subdebt) under different … risks, bank characteristics and regulatory policies affect subdebt prices and yield spreads. It finds that the … have the opposite effects. Also, subdebt spreads are less sensitive to bank risk when PCA is imposed than when capital …

-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the rotected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition … in the deposit market and depressing other banks' margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank's risk taking …