With the Great Recession and the regulatory reform that followed, the search for reliable means to capture systemic risk and to detect macrofinancial problems has become a central concern. In the United States, this concern has been institutionalized through the Financial Stability Oversight...

We show that any objective risk measurement algorithm mandated by central banks for regulated financial entities will result in more risk being taken on by those financial entities than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the risks taken on by the regulated financial entities are far more...

Bilateral derivatives valuation is subject to counterparty credit risk (CCR) in that a counterparty could jump to default or its credit spread could vary over time. In the nomenclature of risk management, the former is called CCR exposure and the later leads to credit valuation adjustment (CVA)....

This paper evaluates the model risk of models used for forecasting systemic and market risk. Model risk, which is the potential for different models to provide inconsistent outcomes, is shown to be increasing with market uncertainty. During calm periods, the underlying risk forecast models...

We propose a semiparametric measure to estimate systemic interconnectedness across financial institutions based on tail-driven spill-over effects in a ultra-high dimensional framework. Methodologically, we employ a variable selection technique in a time series setting in the context of a...

In this paper we propose a new measure for systemic risk: the Financial Risk Meter (FRM). This measure is based on the penalization parameter () of a linear quantile lasso regression. The FRM is calculated by taking the average of the penalization parameters over the 100 largest US publicly...

A systemic risk measure is proposed accounting for links and mutual dependencies between financial institutions utilising tail event information. FRM (Financial Risk Meter) is based on Lasso quantile regression designed to capture tail event co-movements. The FRM focus lies on understanding...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks’ macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...

We present a model where bank assets are a portfolio of risky debt claims and analyze stockholders' risk-taking behavior while considering the strategic interaction between debtors and creditors. We find that: (1) as the leverage of a bank increases, risk shifting by borrowers increases, even if...