The endorsement of expansionary fiscal packages has often been based on the idea that large multipliers can contrast rising unemployment. Is that really the case? We explore those issues in a New Keynesian model in which unemployment arises because of matching frictions. We compare fiscal...

We propose a new fiscal transmission channel based on countercyclical monopsony power in the labor market. We develop a Two-Agent New Keynesian model incorporating a time-varying degree of monopsony power, with workers valuing various job aspects and firms having wage-setting power, inversely...

Millions Saved (2016) is a new edition of detailed case studies on the attributable impact of global health programs at scale. As an input to the book, this paper provides an independent assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a selection of the cases using ex post information from impact...

This paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of US sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences. We use the Synthetic Control Group Method (SCGM) and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the causal effect of mandated sick...

This paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of US sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences. We use the Synthetic Control Group Method (SCGM) and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the causal effect of mandated sick...

The main rationale for wage subsidies is giving job opportunities to workers who would otherwise remain unemployed or take jobs that do not exploit their potential productivity. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the wage subsidy programme in North Macedonia for the period 2018-2019 in order...

This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...

This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced...

This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...