This paper tests for the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints conditional on restrictions in external financing. Financing constraints of firms are identified by an exogenously calculated rating index. Restrictions in external financing are determined by (i) the specific time period...

We use a comprehensive Swedish credit register to document that firms throughout the size distribution have access to fairly large and reasonably priced credit lines, but borrow relatively little from them. We rationalize this using a theoretical framework in which the expected cost of financial...

In private debt contracts with a borrower consent clause, a creditor's decision to transfer its portion of the loan can be thwarted if the borrower denies the consent to loan transfer. We find that the probability of the inclusion of a borrower consent clause in a private debt contract increases...

We investigate how borrower consent clause (BCC) is used in private debt contracts as a contract design mechanism to protect borrower interests. We find that the probability of including a BCC in debt contracts increases in the intensity of creditor control rights measured by number of financial...

We study how differences in the aggregate structure of corporate debt financing affect the transmission of monetary policy. Using high-frequency financial market data to identify monetary policy shocks in a panel of euro area countries, we find that: bond finance dampens the overall response of...

We construct an overlapping generations macroeconomic model with which to study the causes, consequences and remedies to ‘credit traps' — prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalisation, and the misallocation of credit. In our...

Using a cross-country sample of bank-dependent public firms we study the international spillovers of a change in banking regulation on corporate borrowing. For identification we examine how US firms' liabilities vis-à-vis banks, non-bank lenders and bond markets evolve after an increase in...

Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of bank money must not vary over time so agents can easily trade this debt at par. This requires that no agent finds it profitable to produce costly private information about the bank's loans. To produce safe liquidity...

When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks...

The role that banks play in screening and monitoring their borrowers is well understood. However, these bank activities are costly and unobservable, thus difficult to contract upon. This introduces the possibility of shirking and leads to the question – who monitors the monitor? Financial...