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How do Ex-Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?
Rau, P. Raghavendra - 2012
post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116288
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How Do Ex-Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?
Rau, P. Raghavendra - 2013
post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089564
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Value-Risk Tradeoffs and Managerial Incentives
Tsui, David - 2018
managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk … aversion creates potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with … idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk and managers are more risk-averse. Collectively, these results suggest that firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936802
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Managerial Incentives Explanation of Equity Carve-Outs Initial Returns
Seistrajkova, Biljana - 2017
This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970504
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Independent Director Reputation Incentives : The Supply of Monitoring Services
Masulis, Ronald W. - 2017
Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974592
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The Presence, Value, and Incentive Properties of Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation Contracts
Bettis, J. Carr - 2014
Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059189
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Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion and Corporate Policy Decisions
McKnight, Scott - 2016
We provide new evidence that equity incentives can have perverse effects on firm value. Conditioning the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure generated by corporate policy decisions on how risk is expected to affect firm value, we find that delta...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994292
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Merger performance and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
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Merger efficiency and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
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Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device
Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626