This Article presents a skeptical, though not dismissive, view of appraisal arbitrage. While there are benefits associated with appraisal litigation, the Article introduces both economic theory and empirical evidence demonstrating that increased levels of appraisal arbitrage also create...

This chapter presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric information and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of damage caps. Our main findings are as follows. First, our results suggest that the defendant's bias decreases his expenditures on accident...

The United States judicial system is in the midst of great and fundamental change with regard to the funding of litigation. Historically, parties financed litigation out of their own literal or figurative pockets or, perhaps with the assistance of some sort of contingent fee representation....

This chapter examines the basic model of the law and economics of litigation. Because the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Economics of the Litigation/Settlement decision are covered in separate chapters of this volume, this chapter will focus on private civil litigation, in particular the...

The goal of this paper is to study how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by subjects motivated by spiteful preferences -- a potentially common driver for litigation behavior. We focus on litigation and settlement behavior both under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. To...

This paper studies how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures and settlement requests are higher for more spiteful...