Different investor classes are endowed with different rights, and conflicting interests among them can make protections afforded to one party detrimental to another. Indeed, we find that investor protection laws have sizeable "cross" effects on foreign portfolio investment and the direction of...

On the premise that the expropriation of corporate assets by controlling shareholders would generate a residual loss, we studied how the laws of investor protection influenced on the decentralization of corporate ownership and what role the litigation cost play in this story by continuous time...

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...

Short-term debt exposes firms to credit supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether internal monitoring through...

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...