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Career mobility theory suggests that given a certain occupation, schooling improves upward mobility in terms of promotion and wage growth. We are the first to test the implications of this theory for over- and under-education by means of direct information about promotions to managerial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929528
This paper studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden, substantial, and heterogeneous retirement delays....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240682
Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
quality managers are weeded out by the firm, and 2) high quality managers leave because firms are unable to adjust their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012864757
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337995
Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398044
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844386
We study team design in the presence of career concerns. In the model, the agents have explicit effort incentives from performance-dependent compensation contracts and implicit effort incentives from career concerns. With uniform teams, the principal assigns agents with similar career concerns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306244
We propose a two-period matching model of firms and managers to argue that managerial career concerns may not guarantee … assortative matching in the market for reputation. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned … about their reputations. The market updates managers' reputations whenever their performance is available, which leads to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901814
larger firms. Due to the cost of compensating managers for risk, pay-performance sensitivity optimally declines with size …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146732