Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin...

We construct a simple firm-based automata model for global economic inter-dependence of countries using modern notions of self-organized criticality and recently developed dynamical-renormalization-group methods (e.g., L. Pietronero et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 72(11):1690 (1994); J. Hasty and K....

We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, a dominance solvable game, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, play tends toward the...