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Contract Structure and Relationship-Specific Investments : Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets

Tang, Meng-Chi - 2010

Joskow (1987) examined the importance of specific investments to the contract duration of coal contracts. Since … examines how the level of specific investments affect the design of coal contract structure, namely the simultaneous choices of … contract duration and pricing provision. The empirical results show that, from both the separate and joint estimations, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134866

Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships : Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts

Costello, Anna M. - 2013

asymmetry are important determinants of contract design. Asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers leads to shorter …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086012

Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing

Dou, Yiwei - 2013

find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087098

Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing

Dou, Yiwei - 2012

find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115472

Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

Abbott, Alden F.; Wright, Joshua D. - 2008

This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217373

Exclusive Dealing in Asymmetric Platform Competition

Cong, Jiajia; Huang, Yao; Zhou, Wen - 2022

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082628

Vertical Restraints Facilitating Horizontal Collusion : 'Stretching' Agreement in a Comparative Approach

Lubambo, Murilo - 2015

This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive consequences of vertical restraints. I conclude that networks of vertical restraints blur the differences between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014136313

The Identification and Measurement of Market Power and Entry Barriers in Markets Featuring 'Platform' Businesses

Downes, Larry - 2019

In response to the increasing popularity and economic impact of companies in the Internet ecosystem, the Federal Trade Commission is being implored with vocal but factually vacant calls to revisit its approach to antitrust, and in particular market power, barriers to entry and anti-competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892718

Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 1967-2072). 2007

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024585

Coordination and Lock-In : Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026899