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solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a positive valued convex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060245
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731198
commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and … Core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152573
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378792
We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as … to the Weak Sequential Core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118346
in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core selection (or, alternatively, a competitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118764
introduced, under which the value is guaranteed to be an element of the core. For games with complete graph communication the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097263
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087106
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087342