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We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...
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In most dynamic traffic congestion models, congestion tolls must vary continuously over time to achieve the full optimum. This is also the case in Vickrey's (1969) 'bottleneck model'. To date, the closest approximations of this ideal in practice have so-called 'step tolls,' in which the toll...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188626
In the face of capacity disruptions (due, for example, to traffic incidents or poor weather), information provision and congestion pricing are alternative alleviating policies. A state-dependent toll equals the state-dependent marginal external cost (MEC), which is higher if traffic condition is...
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This paper studies the efficiency impacts of private toll roads in initially untolled networks. The analysis allows for capacity and toll choice by private operators, and endogenizes entry and therewith the degree of competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and serial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373827
This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374411
This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of a congestedtransportation network can be tolled. The second-best tax rule for thisproblem is derived for general static networks, so that the solution presentedis valid for any graph of the network and any set of tolling points...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303854