Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

Productive firms can access credit markets directly by issuing corporate bonds or by borrowing through financial intermediaries. In this paper, we study the cyclical properties of corporate credit provision through these two types of debt instruments in major advanced economies. We argue that...

We examine the influence of common ownership on commonalities in the information environment. Specifically, we study commonalities in financial statements and in the actions of key agents such as financial analysts and firm managers who contribute and respond to the information environment....

Scholars and antitrust enforcers have raised concerns about anticompetitive effects that may arise when institutional investors hold substantial stakes in competing firms. Their concern rests on empirical evidence that such common concentrated ownership is associated with higher prices and lower...

How do private equity (PE) investors affect firms' borrowing constraints, debt structure, and leverage dynamics? In this paper, we examine this central question by analyzing a large and novel database of PE-backed, bank-reliant, small and middle market firms in the U.S. using administrative...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

The rapid growth in index funds and significant consolidation in the asset-management industry over the past few decades has led to higher levels of common ownership and increased attention on the topic by academic researchers. A consensus has yet to emerge from the literature regarding the...

We examine the relation between passive ownership and financial reporting quality measured by Beneish's (1999) earnings' manipulation score (M-score). We find that passive ownership is negatively related to M-score and to the likelihood of being designated as a “manipulator” firm. However,...