This study adopted a novel quantile regression via moments to explore the effects of military spending on the distribution of economic growth of 14 MENA countries over the period from 1981 to 2019. The method, apart from enabling us to investigate the effects of military spending on the...

In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an...

We construct a trade-theoretic model for three open economies two of which are in conflict with each other and the third is the source of foreign investments to the two warring countries. War efforts -- which involve the use of soldiers -- is determined endogenously. The purpose of war is the...

Anecdotal evidence relates corruption with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries in the period 1985-98, The association between military...

Defense spending accounts for a larger share of national output in most countries than many of the other allocative decisions, both public and private, which the majority of economic research aims at explaining. Yet with notable exceptions, most economists have ignored this topic and relegated...

This article analyzes the two-stage problem a country faces in first choosing the optimal amount of arms to acquire and then deciding whether it can improve upon the allocation that emerges after the first stage by engaging in a military conflict. A model is introduced based on the concept of...

Defense spending accounts for a large share of the budget in many countries, but the value of the resulting public good - national defense - has so far escaped assessment. Much of the literature has instead considered indirect benefits of defense spending in terms of greater economic growth or...

We present a dynamic two-country model in which military spending, geopolitical risk, and government bond prices are jointly determined. The model is consistent with three empirical facts: hegemons have a funding advantage, this advantage rises with geopolitical tensions, and war losers suffer...

We explore how institutional set-ups, in particular changes in political institutions through coups d'état, can affect the way military expenditures are determined. We use a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, and compare the evolution of the military burden for 40 countries...