We conduct an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals' propensity to engage in bribery and tolerance towards corrupt actors differ across gender. We manipulate the key bribery dimensions — the benefits to corrupt actors and the negative externality caused to other people....

This paper is about the incentive effects of legal presumptions. We analyze three interrelated effects of legal presumptions in a tort setting: (1) incentives to invest in evidence technology; (2) incentives to invest in care-type precautions; and (3) incentives to mitigate excessive activity...

In negligence regimes, tort plaintiffs traditionally bear the burden of proving the negligence of their defendants. Several European legal systems adopted rules that have reversed this traditional evidentiary rule in certain categories of torts, creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence...

Conventional theories of competition classify contests as being either ‘‘productive,' when the competitive efforts generate a surplus for society, or ‘‘unproductive,' when competition generates no social surplus and merely distributes already existing resources. These two discrete...

Tort models predict a symmetry in the behavior of tortfeasors and victims when respectively faced by strict liability and no liability. Tort scholars have widely relied upon this prediction. Yet, the prediction is based on a theoretical economic model that has not yet been empirically tested....

Juries are a fundamental element of the criminal justice system. In this paper, we model jury decision-making as a function of three institutional variables: jury size, voting requirement, and the applicable standard of proof. Changes in jury size, voting requirements, and standards of proof...