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I examine the relation between managerial ownership and the maturity structure of corporate public debt by using a sample of newly issued Japanese corporate bonds. Firms with higher managerial ownership issue shorter maturity bonds. In addition, firms with higher managerial ownership have lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000163
debt ratio and faster (slower) leverage adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level for over-levered (under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000976
This paper studies leverage dynamics when managers cannot commit to future financing and default policies ex … funding advantage of debt. Optimal maturity structure trades off disciplines on the managers' leverage ratcheting incentives …-ante. Managers derive private benefits of control but debt constrains their flexibility, and thus, they build up less excessive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861971
Textbook theory assumes that firm managers maximize the net present value of future cash flows. But when you ask them …). Perhaps this is a mistake. No matter. We take managers at their word and show that EPS maximization provides a single unified … explanation for a wide range of corporate policies such as leverage, share issuance and repurchases, M&A payment method, cash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351328
spreads between corporate yields and Treasury rates are low (high), consistent with efforts by managers to adjust their debt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900955
In this paper, we adapt a continuous-time agency model to incorporate the loss-aversion preferences of agents. To this end, by distinguishing between the gains in capital and income driven by variations in the agent's continuation payoff, we provide a theoretical model which overcomes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938648
managers. Our model predicts that high-quality firms may issue equity in equilibrium, which contrasts the results in Fairchild … (2005). Unlike in Fairchild (2005), managers are not equally overconfident and no exogenously given bankruptcy costs exist …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849787
. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity. Such … overconfident managers use less external finance and, conditional on accessing external capital, issue less equity than their peers … with military experience pursue more aggressive policies, including heightened leverage. Complementary measures of CEO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130991
-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131975
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms' choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853594