The last review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003 followed a period of predominantly upside risks to price stability. Experience following the 2008 financial crisis has focused renewed attention on the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should best interact, in particular...

We evaluate the effects of permanently reducing labour tax rates in the euro area (EA) by simulating a large-scale open economy dynamic general equilibrium model. The model features the EA as a monetary union, split in two regions (Home and the rest of the EA - REA), the US, and the rest of the...

When a monetary union member (a small open economy) borrows and lends with other union members and only has access to conventional debt instruments, its optimal fiscal police is time inconsistent because its governments are short of policy instruments to render optimal fiscal policy time...

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms...

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary-fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities that act strategically vis a vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals...

In light of persistent in ation dispersion and rising debt levels in the EMU, this paper investigates the welfare implications of budget-neutral scal policies that counteract in ation di erentials. In a two-country DSGE model of a monetary union with traded and non-traded goods a national scal...

The aim of our paper is to contribute to the debate on optimal fiscal rules in a monetary union: in terms of global budgetary deficit, of structural budgetary deficit, or of public debt. Indeed, these rules seem to be mixed in the framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union, with the...

Well-functioning risk-sharing arrangements are essential for the shock absorbing capacity and resilience of an economy, even more so for countries in a monetary union where the single monetary policy is unable to address asymmetric shocks. The common shocks that euro area member states have been...

The growing asymmetry in the size of fiscal imbalances poses a serious challenge to the macroeconomic stability of the Euro Area (EA). We show that following a contractionary shock, the current monetary and fiscal framework weakens economic growth even in lowdebt countries because of the zero...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...