A method is proposed to aggregate product-by-product elasticities over groups of products so as to obtain aggregate group-by-group elasticities. It is shown that price-cost margins charged by multi-product firms can be written as minus an aggregate inverse elasticity, just as the traditional...

There are two standard versions for one-shot oligopoly games: the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. The common feature is that in both games the strategic variables are supply curves. Under Cournot the supply curves are vertical lines in price-quantity space, under Bertrand they are horizontal...

Whether a two-sided platform faces a critical-mass problem in its start-up phase depends on how difficult it is to get each of the sides on board when the other side is not yet there – the so-called chicken-and-egg problem. If there is no chicken-and-egg problem, there is no critical-mass...

Collusion, particularly collusion is in the form of hardcore cartel behavior, is the worst antitrust offense of all. People engaging in such conduct should be punished severely. That is the consensus among antitrust officials. I argue against, that collusion is not that bad as antitrust...

In his article “Two-Sided Vs. Complementary Products” Filistrucchi explains in what respect two-sided platforms are different from firms producing complementary products, in spite of the similarity in pricing strategies. For him, the distinguishing feature of two-sided platforms is the...