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Procurement with an endogenous type distribution

Szalay, Dezső - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443086

Optimal incentives for salespeople with learning potential

Gao, Long - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 69 (2023) 6, pp. 3285-3296

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305605

Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market

Gayle, George-Levi; Golan, Limor; Miller, Robert Allen - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 83 (2015) 6, pp. 2293-2369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431546

Portfolio delegation and market efficiency

Malamud, Semyon; Petrov, Evgeny - 2014

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337960

Escalation of commitment and CEO departures : theory and evidence

Chulkov, Dmitriy V.; Barron, John M. - In: Journal of business economics and management 22 (2021) 6, pp. 1416-1435

The escalation of commitment process involves a decision-maker continuing commitment to an investment after receiving … escalating commitment to failing investments and leaving the firm before the outcome of investment decisions is disclosed … publicly. Results of empirical analysis based on a sample of over 3,000 US firms are consistent with the theory and demonstrate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013257237

Extracting information or resource? : the hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information

Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jérôme; Ricci, Francesco - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011692492

Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management

Yang, Kai; Zhao, Ruiqing; Lan, Yanfei - In: International transactions in operational research : … 23 (2016) 4, pp. 749-774

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011606840

Chapter 34 Information, incentives, and the design of agricultural policies

Chambers, Robert G. - In: Handbook of agricultural economics : volume 2, part B, …, (pp. 1751-1825). 2002

This chapter surveys studies that have used the methods of mechanism design, optimal taxation, nonlinear pricing, and principal-agent analyses in the analysis of agricultural policy. The optimal design and reform of agricultural policy are studied under the presumption that agricultural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024092

Robust contracting under double moral hazard

Carroll, Gabriel; Bolte, Lukas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1623-1663

We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091

Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara; Voigt, Guido - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491904

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