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Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market

Attar, Andrea (contributor); Campioni, Eloisa (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003287680

Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa - In: Structural change and economic dynamics : SC+ED 18 (2007) 2, pp. 249-269

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003457248

On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenae͏̈l; … - In: Games and economic behavior 68 (2010) 1, pp. 376-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929827

Multiple lending and constrained effeiciency in the credit market

Attar, Andrea (contributor); Campioni, Eloisa (contributor); … - In: Contributions to theoretical economics 6 (2006) 1, pp. 1-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003382788

Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market

Attar, Andrea (contributor); Campioni, Eloisa (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797205

Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenae͏̈l; … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002347631

Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market

Attar, Andrea (contributor); Campioni, Eloisa (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397715

Private communication in competing mechanism games

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenaël - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181864

Private communication in competing mechanism games

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenaël - In: Journal of economic theory 183 (2019), pp. 258-283

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131335

On Multiple-Principal, Multiple-Agent Models of Moral Hazard

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael; … - 2009

We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1 shows that a strongly robust equilibrium in simple (direct) mechanisms can no longer be sustained as an equilibrium when a principal can deviate to an indirect communication scheme. Conversely,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064609