This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

While private actions for damages by customers against price-cartels receive much attention, the treatment of other groups affected by such conspiracies is largely unresolved. This article narrows the research gap with respect to suppliers to a downstream price cartel. First, we show that such...

Although much has been written about RPM and Exclusive Dealing, acting alone, scant attention has been paid to the welfare outcome when the 2 restraints are imposed together. The article examines 2 such cases. Salton's George Foreman Contact Grills and ordinary incandescent light bulbs. It shows...

This paper aims to answer the question whether the current (EU) antitrust law is well-equipped to deal with explicit collusion by pricing algorithms that act independently from the companies using them. The paper unfolds in three main parts: first, it outlines the exact circumstances of the...