The collective behavior of a group of technology industry oligopolists to fix input prices of patented technology so as to increase profits and constrain competition is analyzed in light of antitrust cases. The antitrust laws and the patent system are seen as complementary, with antitrust laws...

This study reveals two different rationales for consumer surplus-enhancing collusion. The first model considers two competitive firms in the final product market, each with one essential patent necessary for production. The equilibrium price under collusion is lower than the price under...

Antitrust law has long been mindful of the danger that firms may misuse their patents to facilitate price fixing. Courts and commentators addressing this danger have assumed that patent-facilitated price fixing occurs in a single market. In this Article, we extend conventional analysis to...

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-setting organizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law. Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patent owners can “hold up” patent users in the sense of demanding high royalties for a patented input after...

This essay considers antitrust objections to recent settlements of intellectual property litigation. Part I examines the Google Book Search settlement, which resolves a copyright dispute between Google and a class of authors and publishers, including the creators of so-called orphan works. It...