We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications in a population partially composed of such agents. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show...

In this paper we show how imperfect memory can imply a preference for increasing payments. We model an agent making a decision regarding effort in two periods where the cost of effort is imperfectly known. Before making the first decision, the agent receives a signal related to the cost of...

We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

We design an induced value choice experiment where the objects are valued according to only a single attribute with a continuous measure. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice objects but they can reduce their imperfect perception with cognitive effort. Subjects are given a choice...

Kording and Wolpert (2004), hereafter referred to as KW, describe an experiment where subjects engaged in a repeated task entailing movements of their finger. Subjects strove for accuracy in the stochastic environment and, on some trials, received mid-trial and post-trial feedback. KW claims...