This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination...

The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so...

The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so...

Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the...

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the power of forward guidance at different horizons, shedding new light on the strength of the "forward guidance puzzle". Our identification strategy allows us to disentangle the change in future interest rates stemming from deviations from the...

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants’ expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents’ learning and the dynamics of the...

We describe the inflation targeting framework (ITF) and compare it against hypothetical best-practice based on optimization. The core requirements of the ITF are an explicit long-run inflation goal and a commitment to transparency in policymaking. Advocates and practitioners of the ITF have made...

We propose a new interest rate rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and eliminates all indeterminacy in a canonical New Keynesian model in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is binding. The rule commits to zero nominal interest rates for a length of time that...

I give necessary and sufficient conditions under which interest-rate feedback rules eliminate aggregate instability by inducing a globally unique optimal equilibrium in a canonical New Keynesian economy with a binding zero lower bound. I consider a central bank that initially keeps interest...