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Tournaments versus piece rates under limited liability
Kräkel, Matthias - 2004
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343971
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Limited liability and the trade-off between risk and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk … risk and incentives can be explained. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383029
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Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers
Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
individual prizes that satisfy a self-commitment condition and induce effcient incentives at the same time, thus solving a … rents and the adjustment of individual incentives, which will be important for the employer if he cannot rely on handicaps. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383017
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Preemptive behavior in sequential tournaments
Jost, Peter-J.; Kräkel, Matthias - 2000
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335241
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Incentives and Anonymity Principle : Crowding Out Toward Users
Crifo, Patricia; Rulliere, Jean-Louis - 2021
anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318907
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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The Real Effects of Tournament Incentives : The Case of Firm Innovation
Jia, Ning - 2020
This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation …. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other … tournament incentives. The attraction of talent and the reduction in excessive board interventions appear two plausible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855711
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Tournament Incentives and Reserve Management
Nart, Ahmet - 2020
This paper examines the relation between tournament incentives and reserve management. We find a positive relation … between internal tournament incentives and reserve errors, implying that a larger pay gap as a tournament prize induces vice … profitability. In addition, we find the impact of internal tournament incentives on the reserve error is more pronounced for larger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845912
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Treatment of Outliers : Firm Heterogeneity in Managerial Incentive and Corporate Innovation
Ho, Wai-Tung - 2018
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are frequently used to measure the effects of managerial incentives on corporate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927101