We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only...

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in...

We study the effects of a vertical merger in a setting with a single upstream supplier of a critical input and two downstream customers which compete with each other. Initially, the upstream supplier first announces prices, then the two downstream customers announce their retail prices. We find...

In many recent abuse of dominance antitrust cases, the dominant supplier adopts pricing schemes involving conditional rebates, whereas its smaller competitors often use simple linear pricing. We provide a game-theoretic justification for the observed asymmetry in pricing practices by studying a...

This paper analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market...

Moresi and Salop (2013) have extended the “upward pricing pressure” approach used in analyzing horizontal mergers to the analysis of vertical mergers. They present test expressions called the vGUPPIu and vGUPPId to see if the upstream and downstream prices will rise as a result of the...

We analyze competing strategic platforms setting fees to a local monopolist merchant and granting cash-back rebates to end users, when the merchant is prevented from surcharging platforms customers, as frequently occurs with credit cards. Each platform has an incentive to gain transactions by...

We provide an explanation for a frequently observed vertical restraint in ecommerce, namely that brand manufacturers partially or completely prohibit that retailers distribute their high-quality products over the internet. Our analysis is based on the assumption that a consumer's purchasing...

Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition of electricity market liberalisation. A well-developed and liquid contracts market is similarly suggested as necessary to manage the resulting wholesale market risks, which risks are further...