The study of firms' default has attracted wide interest among both practitioners and scholars. However, attention has often been limited to a relatively small set of financial variables. In this work, we try to increase the scope of analysis extending the investigation to other possible...

This paper introduces a new rationale for the existence of "Directors' and Officers'" (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize long...

In the field of finance, the arguments for and against the goal of shareholder value maximization often arise due to: (i) the lack of distinction between the short-run and the long-run corporate performance and objectives, and (ii) the exclusion of time dimension from both theory and practice of...

We investigate whether the concentration of power in the hands of individuals characterized as business leaders influences the variability of corporate performance. We do so by proposing an original method to estimate the concentration of power that takes into account both the individual...

There is little consensus regarding the overall performance of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry. The goal of this paper is to investigate the change in operating performance, efficiency, and value addition of US bank mergers and acquisitions after GLBA. We extend the previous...

While standard contract theory suggests that a CEO should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effects of sector performance, there is evidence that CEO pay is strongly and positively related to such sector performance. Many have coined this relationship as pay for luck. In this...

We examine whether and to what extent managers are evaluated, in their relative performance contracts, on the basis of systematic performance. Focusing on relative total shareholder returns (rTSR), the predominant metric specified in these contracts and used by market participants to evaluate...

This paper intends to lay out a framework to identify self-selection bias and how it can be used practically to analyze CEO duality in the field of corporate governance. Prior literature about agency theory and stewardship theory have argued extensively in this topic yet most of them treat...

We examine the robustness of empirical models and findings concerning CEO turnover. We show that the sensitivity of turnover to abnormal firm performance is an extremely robust result. In contrast, evidence indicating a relation between turnover and industry performance is both weak and fragile....

This paper uses hand-collected data to study CEO's cash signing bonus among listed U.S. firms. Empirical findings suggest that issuing cash signing bonus is not motivated by free cash flow problem or by a higher termination risk of the new position . Instead, CEOs who receive cash signing bonus...