The present paper develops a simple asymmetrical informational model that allows us to understand the individual´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor and enforce hours and offer different workweeks to...

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 ("Pre-Bosman" or P), currently in use ("Bosman" or B), and recently approved ("Monti" or M) differ with...

In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which...

I examine whether reference points can provide an explanation for rigid wages in recessions. Even though a recession provides a good reason to adjust wages downward, workers' perception of a "fair wage" may depend on their previous wage, their reference point. Using a laboratory experiment, I...