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The ex ante theory of collateral states that better informed lenders, such as informal lenders, rely less on collateral …. We test this by contrasting the use of collateral between formal and informal lenders in the same market. Indeed, formal … lenders rely more often on collateral, controlling for conventional determinants of collateral. Moreover, better information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342166
bank's choice of collateral standards in its lending facilities. Optimism on the side of banks, entailing a higher … collateral value of bank loans, can lead to excessive lending and bank default. Pessimism, though, can entail insufficient … lending and productivity losses. With an appropriate haircut on collateral, the central bank can perfectly neutralize the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585474
We offer a new test of the ex ante theory of collateral. Theory states that lenders rely less on collateral if they … have better information about borrowers. We test this by contrasting the use of collateral between formal and – better … informed – informal lenders in a developing financial market. Indeed, formal lenders rely about 40% more often on collateral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010192360
We establish that a monopoly bank never uses collateral as a screening device. A pooling equilibrium always exists in … which all borrowers pay the same interest rate and put zero collateral. Absence of screening leads to socially inefficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011720504
We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960063
This paper analyzes the influence of market discipline on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that market discipline reduces risk if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk before the interest rate on deposits is set. If, however, the bank can readjust the level of risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398285
Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits before the announcement of deposit insurance, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421243
I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012135982
We study optimal capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. Firms hold deposits for precautionary reasons and to facilitate the acquisition of production inputs. Our theoretical analysis identifies a novel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012132611
This paper investigates how deposit insurance and capital adequacy affect bank risk for five developed and nine emerging markets over the period of 1992–2015. Although full coverage of deposit insurance induces moral hazard by banks, deposit insurance is still an effective tool, especially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960605