Operational risk is a substantial source of risk for US banks. Improving the performance of operational risk models' allows banks' management to make better risk decisions by better matching economic capital and risk appetite, and allows regulators to better understand the risk of banks. We show...

Operational risk is a substantial source of risk for US banks. Improving the performance of operational risk models allows banks’ management to make more informed risk decisions by better matching economic capital and risk appetite, and allows regulators to enhance their understanding of...

This paper provides new indices of global macroeconomic uncertainty and investigates the cross-country transmission of uncertainty using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model. The indices measure the dispersion of forecasts that results from parameter uncertainty in the GVAR. Relying on...

We investigate the ambiguity spillover among international equity markets. We follow Brennan and Izhakian (2018) and develop monthly ambiguity measures using high-frequency trading data of equity indices. The ambiguity spillover demonstrates noticeable asymmetry. The US equity market is the...

We propose an approach for jointly measuring global macroeconomic uncertainty and bilateral spillovers of uncertainty between countries using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model. Over the period 2000Q1-2020Q4, our global index is able to summarize a variety of uncertainty measures, such...

We examine the transmission of global macro-financial uncertainty to economic activity depending on the current state of the banking sector. Previous literature suggests that credit supply and uncertainty shocks are important drivers of economic activity, but the distinction between the two is...

We address the moral hazard problem of securitization using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. Our model considers structured asset-backed securitization with a credit enhancement (tranching) procedure. We assume that the originator can...

We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors' decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors' actions only if connected by the network....

We address the moral hazard problem of securitization using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. Our model considers structured asset-backed securitization with a credit enhancement procedure. We assume that the originator can affect the...

There is an asymmetry regarding what previous decisions depositors may observe when choosing whether to withdraw or keep the money deposited: it is more likely that withdrawals are observed. We study how decision-making changes if depositors are able to make their decision to keep their funds in...