This chapter reviews topics related to the demand for health insurance, including the question of how choice of health insurance should be structured for consumers. After the first section summarizes some of the institutional features of health insurance in high- and middle-income countries, a...

This paper examines the publication of quality indicators in service markets with public finance systems, such as education and healthcare markets. We provide a spatial model of product differentiation in which the reporting of such indicators increases consumers’ decision weight on quality...

One key assumption underlying interventions and policies aiming to promote development by increasing the accumulation of human capital, particularly health capital, is that increasing access to and utilisation of health services will translate into health capital. This assumption, from...

Our paper empirically examines how the decision to purchase private insurance and hospitalization are made based on household income, socio-demographic factors, and private health insurance factors in both Japan and the USA. Using these two data-sets, we found some similarities and...

How should we govern professional advice given by artificial intelligence (AI)? The traditional professional-client or doctor-patient relationship is governed by a specific set of legal rules that constitute the legal framework of professional advice-giving. The goal of this legal framework is...

Using a large survey panel that connects household shopping behavior with individual health information, this paper documents correlations between self reported depression and the size and composition of shopping baskets. First, we find that roughly 16% of individuals report suffering from...

Millions Saved (2016) is a new edition of detailed case studies on the attributable impact of global health programs at scale. As an input to the book, this paper provides an independent assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a selection of the cases using ex post information from impact...

This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the...

In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...