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Duration of debt overhang with two lender banks

Prokop, Jacek - In: Economics letters 38 (1992) 4, pp. 473-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001125436

Organized debt buybacks : no cure for free riding?

Prokop, Jacek - In: Journal of development economics 47 (1995) 2, pp. 481-496

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001188479

Przyczynek do teorii przejmowania kontroli nad spółkami akcyjnymi

Prokop, Jacek - 2001 - Wyd. 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001628525

Process of dominant-cartel formation

Prokop, Jacek - In: International journal of industrial organization 17 (1999) 2, pp. 241-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001426334

Monopolisation of triopoly : revisited

Prokop, Jacek - In: International journal of computational economics and … 1 (2009) 2, pp. 113-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003984943

Warunkowe i bezwarunkowe oferty wykupu spółek akcyjnych

Prokop, Jacek - In: Ekonomista : czasopismo poświe̜cone nauce i potrzebom … (1999) 6, pp. 723-753

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001458830

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

Kaneko, Mamoru - In: Journal of economics 58 (1993) 1, pp. 1-24

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001147150

Dynamics of international debt overhang with two lender banks

Prokop, Jacek - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 49 (1998) 2, pp. 119-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001241740

Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements in a one-shot development race

Prokop, Jacek; Regibeau, Pierre; Rockett, Katharine - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000891719

Patent hold-up and royalty stacking : the case of multiple downstream firms : International Conference on Applied Economics, ICOAE 2015, 2-4 July 2015, Kazan, Russia

Karbowski, Adam; Prokop, Jacek - 2015

The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the patent hold-up problem in game-theoretic framework. We show that in subgame perfect equilibrium of the patent hold-up game the innovating manufacturer exerts reduced effort to develop the new product and the patent holder obtains the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429564