Many adverse selection models of standard one-period debt contracts are based on the following seemingly innocuous assumptions. First, entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of their return distributions. Second, return distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood-ratio...

We consider a privately informed issuer which holds a portfolio of assets that can be sold to raise cash, where the fractions of assets sold serve as a multidimensional signal. If good news about one asset is good news for the others, then there is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the...

This paper develops a theoretical model explaining management's choice of using corporate cash flow to pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in a real project. The model demonstrates the case in which managers have better information than investors about the quality of the firm...

This paper studies the effects of changes in uncertainty on optimal leverage and investment in a dynamic firm-financing model in which firms have access to complete markets subject to collateral constraints. Entrepreneurs finance projects with their net worth and by issuing state-contingent...

In this paper we analyze performance-based remuneration for risk-averse managers in a Black Scholes-type model. We assume that the firm's performance is influenced by an industry and a firm-specific risk. A relative performance compensation which rewards a manager relative to the exogenous...

Signaling models contributed to the corporate finance literature by formalizing "the informational content of dividends" hypothesis. However, these models are under criticism as the empirical literature found weak evidences supporting a central prediction: the positive relationship between...

We explore the link between open market share repurchases (OMRs) and asymmetric information - based on financial reporting quality - and find opaque firms experience positive abnormal returns twice the magnitude of transparent firms. These significant differences remain after controlling for...

This paper uses the insider trading direction as a signal to design an optimal wage contract, where the principal-agent problem due to moral hazard is resolved. Insider trading provides the corporation important information about the action of the manager. It is a tough challenge for the owners...

This paper studies the authorization and execution of buybacks in a Kyle micro-structure setting with two informed parties: a speculator who trades on his own account and a manager who implements buybacks for the firm. Buybacks introduce two opposing economic forces. On the one hand, informed...

Moral hazard and disagreement are important economic frictions. How do their individual effects on economic behavior differ and how do these frictions interact when operating together? This paper addresses these questions by developing a canonical model of disagreement (generated by...