I model a firm that invests in both the quality of its product and in providing information to the market. Consumers learn about the quality through both news the firm cannot influence and promotion it controls. This ability to promote creates and enhances incentives for investment. Promotion...

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...

I study how a firm manages its reputation by investing in the quality of its product and censoring bad news. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight two discontinuities in the firm's maximum equilibrium payoff the introduction of...

Recent empirical studies suggest that, during times of unexpected innovation, agents heterogeneously update their beliefs about an asset fundamental value, and they are uncertain about other agents' beliefs on it. In this paper I show that, when there is uncertainty about the market sentiment,...

We study a firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified at a cost. We characterize all Markov-perfect equilibria where the firm's choices -i.e., timing of certification and investment– depend only on the firm's reputation. MPE...

We analyse the effect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability of sudden stops of capital flows from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Our model predicts that the probability of crises increases with the uncertainty, ie. the dispersion of private signals about the true...

We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game....

Despite major recent advance in the literature on financial crises, the key role of central banks in the dynamics of financial crises are still not well understood. Our aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of financial crises by explicitly modeling the strategic options...

We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in productive activities requiring the input of multiple agents. We show that discrimination can persist under perfectly observable ability, when taste for...

Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...