Relying on a menu-cost model augmented with a time-dependent (Calvo) component, we investigate the structural sources of cross-sectoral heterogeneity in patterns of price setting. We use a large micro dataset of French consumer prices to estimate the model at the product level for 227 products....

We study the price rigidity of regular and sale prices, and how it is affected by pricing formats (i.e., pricing strategies). We use data from three large Canadian stores with different pricing formats (Every-Day-Low-Price, Hi-Lo, and Hybrid) that are located within a 1 km radius of each other....

Studies of micro-level price datasets find more frequent small price increases than decreases, which can be explained by consumer inattention because time-constrained shoppers might ignore small price changes. Recent empirical studies of the link between shopping behavior and price attention...

This paper examines the relation between prices in conventional stores and on the Internet. Main results from the theoretical analysis are i) we expect a discrete fall in prices in conventional stores as the share of the population with access to Internet reaches a critical level, ii) the...

We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

We consider market dynamics in a reduced form model. In the simplest version, there are two investors and several small noninvesting firms. In each period, one investor can acquire a small firm, the other investor decides about market entry. After that all firms play an oligopoly game. We derive...