In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior,...

This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous....

We study the Shapley wage function, a wage scheme in which a worker's pay depends both on the number of hours worked and on the output of the firm. We then provide a way to measure the distance of an arbitrary wage scheme to this function in limited datasets. In particular, for a fixed...

Instead of taking the orthodox view of business corporations as nexuses of contracts as a basic premise, this article focuses on their aspect as “incorporating” autonomous systems of associational (group-level) cognition for business objectives. In order for such a system to be consistent...

The unique properties of the Shapley value-efficiency, equal treatment of identical input factors, and marginality{have made it an appealing solution concept in various classes of problems. It is however recognized that the pay schemes utilized in many real-life situations generally depart from...