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Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo

Dziuda, Wioletta; Loeper, Antoine - 2012 - First version: December 2009

This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748538

Riskiness, risk aversion, and risk sharing: cooperation in a dynamic insurance game

Laczó, Sarolta (contributor) - 2008

This paper examines how cooperation in an insurance game depends on risk preferences and the riskiness of income. It … of the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing. When agents face no aggregate risk, there is … of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. In the case of exponential (isoelastic) utility, cooperation depends positively on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003770693

Voting Rules in a Changing Environment

Dziuda, Wioletta - 2015

Inclusive voting rules are rules that require the approval of a greater set of policy makers than a simple majority. Using a dynamic voting model with stochastic shocks, we identify a novel distortive effect of inclusive voting rules. Under inclusive voting rules, the identity of the pivotal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032377

On the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Foreign Aid, and Freedom

Faria, João Ricardo - 2019

This paper presents an extension of the two-period Samaritan's Dilemma in order to analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote freedom. An example is the United States' recent opening towards Cuba. It is shown that a donor nation's dual concern for economic reforms and greater freedoms can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890227

Dynamic Enfranchisement

Lagunoff, Roger D.; Jack, William - 2003

Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We study properties of dynamic enfranchisement games, dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030461

Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

Bowen, T. Renee; Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya; Zápal, Jan - 2015

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862003

Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision

Bowen, T. Renee - 2018

Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936889

A Theory of Political Cycles

Martinez, Leonardo - 2012

We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096988

Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372

Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes : A Dynamic Perspective

Gersbach, Hans; Jackson, Matthew O.; Muller, Philippe; … - 2020

We analyze dynamic electoral competition policy changes. The costs of changing a policy increase with the extent of the shift and generate an incumbency advantage. We characterize the dynamics of Markov equilibria in terms of history and party polarization, and analyze how policies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014096647