We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities depend on the history of the play, i.e., the players' past action choices. To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward criterion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards which can be...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one "objective" resource game may induce "subjective" games...

We present a model of a multi-species fishery and show that (i) consumer preferences for seafood diversity may trigger a sequential collapse of fish stocks under open-access fishery, (ii) the stronger the preferences are for diversity the higher is the need for coordinated multi-species...

Catastrophic risk is currently a hotly debated topic. This paper contributes to this debate by showing two results. First it shown that the value function in dynamic optimization can have an infinite derivative at some point even if the model specification has functional forms that are finite...

We analyze the effect of environmental uncertainties on optimal fishery management in a bio-economic fishery model. Unlike most of the literature on resource economics, but in line with ecological models, we allow the different biological processes of survival and recruitment to be affected...

William Forster Lloyd's 1833 sketch about poor cattle on the commons and the well-fed animals on the adjacent enclosures published in his "Two lectures on the checks to population" has hitherto been assessed as one starting point of the economics of renewable resources. In the 20th century the...

In many spatial resource models it is assumed that the agent is able to determine the harvesting activity over the complete spatial domain. However, agents frequently have only access to a resource at particular locations at which the moving biomass, such as fish or game, may be caught or...

Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form output-sharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level. Whether individuals manage to form the efficient...

We consider a framework featuring a central bank, private and financial agents as well as a financial market. The central bank's objective is to maximize a functional, which measures the classical trade-off between output and inflation plus income from the sales of inflation linked calls minus...