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Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
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Information sharing in contests
Kovenock, Daniel J.; Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010
contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822740
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Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063
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Information acquisition in conflicts
Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481
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Conflict and the Social Contract
Bester, Helmut - 2006
potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780612
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Alliances in the shadow of conflict
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2013
conflict and more intense fighting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198485
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How to talk to multiple audiences
Goltsman, Maria (contributor); Pavlov, Gregory (contributor) - 2008
We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772300
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Political polarization
Dixit, Avinash K. (contributor);  … - 2007 - This revision: April 19, 2007
Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003426464
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Communication and decision-making in corporate boards
Malenko, Nadya - 2011
Time constraints, managerial power, and reputational concerns can impede board communication. This paper develops a model where board decisions depend on directors' effort in communicating their information to others. I show that directors communicate more effectively when pressure for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506636
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Activists versus captured regulators
Daubanes, Julien; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2013
We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199716