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Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

Herold, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 542-551

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909231

Theevolution of taking roles

Herold, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011736808

Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust

Herold, Florian - In: Games and economic behavior 68 (2010) 1, pp. 180-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929766

The costs and benefits of a separation of powers : an incomplete contracts approach

Fuchs, Kira; Herold, Florian - In: American law and economics review : the journal of the … 13 (2011) 1, pp. 131-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009310992

Carrot or stick? : the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a Haystack model

Herold, Florian - In: The American economic review 102 (2012) 2, pp. 914-940

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009568911

Contractual Incompleteness as a Signal of Trust

Herold, Florian - 2008

This paper shows how the fear of signaling distrust can endogenously lead to incomplete contractual agreements. According to standard results in contract theory an optimal incentive contract should be conditional on all verifiable information containing statistical information about an agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724994