Most dynamic models of congestion pricing use fully time-variant tolls. However, in practice, tolls are uniform over the day or at most have a few steps. Such uniform and step tolls have received surprisingly little attention from the literature. Moreover, most models that do study them assume...

The theory of road pricing developed for single links suggests time andlocation varying charges equal to the marginal congestion cost at the efficientlevel of traffic. The second-best network counterpart is derived, but would beinfeasible to implement. Cordon tolls are feasible, and their...

"Robot cars" are cars that allow for automated driving. They can drive closer together than human driven "normal cars" and thereby raise road capacity. Obtaining a robot car instead of a normal car can also be expected to lower the userś value of time losses (VOT), because travel time can be...

This paper presents a dynamic model of road traffic congestion based on simple carfollowing theory, allowing for finite group velocity and discrete vehicles. The model offers a full-fledged dynamic version of the standard static model of road traffic congestion based on the so-called...

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

This paper studies the efficiency impacts of private toll roads in initially untolled networks. The analysis allows for capacity and toll choice by private operators, and endogenizes entry and therewith the degree of competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and serial...

This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

In studying congestion tolling, it is important to account for heterogeneity in preferences of drivers, as ignoring it can bias the welfare gains. We analyse the effects of tolling, in the bottleneck model, with continuous heterogeneity in the value of time and schedule delay. The welfare gain...

This paper analyzes the possibilities to relieve congestion using rewards instead of taxes, as well as combinations of rewards and taxes. The model considers a Vickrey-ADL model of bottleneck congestion with endogenous scheduling. With inelastic demand, a fine (time-varying) reward is equivalent...